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Conflict and Change

New York City’s Rebirth after 9/11
Zachary Baron Shemtob, Patrick Sweeney,
and Susan Opotow

9/11

was a world- historical event. It is therefore of little surprise that so much attention has been paid to its impact
on American society and global affairs. What has been less studied is
9/11’s direct impact on those persons most directly affected by the World
Trade Center’s destruction: the residents of New York City and Lower
Manhattan. By using New York Times articles as data, this chapter surveys
the lived experiences of New Yorkers in 9/11’s aftermath, focused in particular on the five years that followed this horrifying event and the 2010
controversy surrounding the so- called Ground Zero Mosque.
We begin this chapter by sketching out how scholars have defined the
concept of a disaster and the idea that, in a disaster’s wake, a community
resumes its prior equilibrium or adapts to a new one.1 We then identify
various priorities that consumed post–9/11 New Yorkers, noting how
some of these priorities quickly came into conflict. Specifically, we found
that New Yorkers were initially concerned with whether life would return
to normal, before shifting their focus to concerns over the physical rebuilding process and the political struggles that such recovery entailed.
We then compare these findings with the controversy over the so- called
Ground Zero Mosque several years later. Finally, we describe a new equilibrium that emerged among New Yorkers directly and indirectly affected
by 9/11, which is still being shaped to this day.
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Understanding Disaster
American sociologists began systematically studying disasters during World
War II through military- funded research that focused on civilian populations’ response to large- scale bombings.2 Disaster research accelerated
in the 1950s when the National Academy of Sciences National Research
Council began supporting research on large- scale natural and technological crises.3 Despite six decades of research on populations’ responses to
disasters,4 sociologists continue to develop and debate the meaning of the
term “disaster.”5
Perhaps Charles Fritz’s 1961 definition of disaster remains the most
prominent as an event “in which a society, or a relatively self- sufficient
subdivision of a society, undergoes several dangers and incurs such loses
to its members and physical appurtenances that the social structure is disrupted and the fulfillment of all or some of the essential functions of the
society is prevented.”6 According to Fritz, disasters inevitably: (1) threaten
biological survival, including subsistence, shelter, and health; (2) disrupt the
normal order of things, including a society’s divisions of labor, authority
patterns, cultural norms, and social roles; (3) threaten values, shared definitions of reality, and communication mechanisms; and (4) modify motivations within social and cultural systems. Elaborating on Fritz’s definition,
Russell Dynes identified seven central elements of disaster: (1) an event
(2) located in time and space (3) in which a community (4) undergoes severe danger (5) and incurs losses (6) so that the social structure is disrupted
(7) and the fulfillment of all or some of its essential functions is prevented.7
Stanley Cohen has additionally focused on how disasters disrupt the
normal order of things.8 According to Cohen, after such events a “community either recovers its former equilibrium or achieves a stable adaptation to the changes which the disaster may have brought about.”9 Kai
Erikson has further explored this idea.10 After studying a disastrous flood
at Buffalo Creek, West Virginia, Erikson concluded that persons affected
by disaster undergo (1) the sense that the disaster will never end; (2) the
feeling of vulnerability from having lost a sense of immunity to misfortune; (3) a changed sense of oneself, including how one relates to others;
and (4) a changed view of the world that now includes a sense of life’s
utter precariousness. Erikson, like Cohen, argues that it is not disaster, per
se, that leads to change, but it is “how people react to them rather than what
they are that give [such] events whatever traumatic quality they can be said
to have” (italics in original).11
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September 11 in the New York Times
Few disasters in United States history compare to the 9/11 attacks, which
affected communities throughout the country and the globe. This event
took the lives of passengers and crew aboard four hijacked airplanes in
New York City; Arlington, Virginia; and Shanksville, Pennsylvania; workers
and visitors at the World Trade Center; military personnel at the Pentagon;
and people who later died from exposure to toxic wreckage resulting from
the attacks.12 But of the almost 3,000 fatalities that resulted from the attacks
on New York City and Washington DC on 9/11, most (93 percent, over
2,800 deaths) occurred in a single community, Lower Manhattan.13
Post- disaster 9/11 scholarship concerning New York City has largely
focused on (1) the short- term dynamics at the macro level, as the city as
a whole moved from shock to solidarity;14 (2) the longer- term dynamics
focused at the individual level, particularly individual bereavement, trauma,
and PTSD;15 (3) Islamophobic bias and violence directed at people perceived to be Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim;16 and (4) evaluations of
technical aspects of the 9/11 attacks from the perspective of specific professions, such as technology, security, and mental health.17 Far fewer studies
have focused, as we do, on the years- long trajectory of this tragic event in
the lives of New Yorkers after 9/11.

Researching Post–9/11 New York City
To study how New Yorkers responded to the events of 9/11, we worked
from an archive of New York Times articles that one of us (Opotow) gathered from September 2001 until five years later when stories of everyday
New Yorkers’ responses to 9/11 became less prominent in the news. These
news articles offer unparalleled insight into the immediate aftermath of
9/11 and provide information on those affected by the attacks, and how
the attack impacted everyday lives in many different spheres of society.
We recognize that such articles are not free of bias, as people with fewer
resources and who do not affect the flow of profits and corporate agendas
may get less attention in the news.18 And, as we discuss in the following
section, media interest in once- newsworthy topics fades dramatically over
time.19 Nevertheless, after 9/11, newspapers offered unparalleled access
into New Yorkers’ immediate and long- term responses to this event. Specifically, the New York Times, a newspaper of record with a long- established
reputation for meeting high journalistic standards,20 devoted significant
space to New York City and Lower Manhattan in the aftermath of 9/11,
offering rich and detailed accounts of 9/11 and its effects on the city.
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To conduct this study, we first constructed an archive of New York Times
articles focusing on the aftermath of the World Trade Center attacks in
New York City. By the three- year mark, we had collected more than three
thousand articles. By 2006 this topic became less frequent in the news,
and we therefore decided that this was a natural stopping point. Working
alongside research assistants,21 we sorted the articles from this five- year
period using an iterative process of coding, discussing, and recoding the
articles to create a set of categories encompassing diverse topics and levels
of analysis, from individuals to neighborhoods, institutions, agencies, and
the city as a whole. Prominent categories included: fear of terrorism, rescue and recovery, changes in routines, death, health, injury, economic loss,
the families of people who died, the victim compensation fund, replacing
the World Trade Center, rescue and recovery crews, economic impacts,
Lower Manhattan restoration and redevelopment, emerging memorials,
and 9/11 in the arts. Based on this, we ultimately developed a set of six
overarching categories: (1) compensation; (2) World Trade Center rebirth; (3) narratives about everyday lives; (4) fear, health, and quality of life;
(5) emerging memorials around the world; and (6) artistic works on 9/11.
For this chapter, we report on one category, World Trade Center rebirth. This category centers on New York City’s journey from damage to
regeneration, reporting on how New Yorkers sought to recover in 9/11’s
aftermath and how this was understood and enacted at the personal and
civic levels. It thus offers a nuanced and unique account of the physical,
psychological, and civic challenge New Yorkers faced as they sought to
rebuild their own lives as well as the World Trade Center site (dubbed
“Ground Zero”) and lower Manhattan.22
Replicating the collaborative and interactive process used in our initial coding of all the articles, we identified eight subcategories for World
Trade Center rebirth:
1. Professional/architectural planning (n = 176): Articles dealing
with professionals (other than politicians) directly involved with
rebuilding the World Trade Center, including the buildings,
landscape, and urban design surrounding this project.
2. Political issues (n = 131): Articles describing the political climate
that emerged in the rebuilding process. These focused on
specific political figures (e.g., mayors, governors, senators, etc.)
and political struggles at city, state, and federal levels that arose
over various projects.
3. Business/economy (n = 94): Articles focusing on the rebuilding
of New York City’s economic infrastructure, the reopening of
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4.
5.
6.

7.

8.

restaurants and retail stores, the revival of tourism, and financial
aid from the state and government to businesses and industries.
Return to normality (n = 83): Articles focusing on New Yorkers
attempt to recover from 9/11 while also recognizing that their
lives had irrevocably changed.
Citizen participation in planning (n = 65): Articles focused on
public participation in the rebuilding process.
Sadness/melancholy (n = 33): Articles focusing on New Yorkers’
emotional trauma, sadness, and sense of paralysis, as well as articles
recounting how individuals, communities, and organizations had
difficulty functioning optimally or moving forward after 9/11.
Cleanup (n = 19): Articles focusing on the removal of bodies
from the World Trade Center site, the discovery of bone
fragments and personal items in the debris, and health hazards
resulting from the World Trade Center’s collapse.
Progress and deadlines (n = 16): Articles focusing on the disparities
between project completion dates and progress on the ground.

We then charted the frequencies of these eight categories using 30 percent as a viable cutoff point to designate dominant categories for each
year (see Appendix A). The most dominant categories that emerged were:
return to normality (33 percent, 2001), business/economy (31 percent,
2001), professional/architectural planning (31 percent, 43 percent, and
40 percent, 2002–2004 respectively), and politics (44 percent and 42 percent, 2005–2006 respectively). Interestingly, we also found that the dominant categories shifted over these five years. The next section describes
these findings year by year.

Year by Year: World Trade Center Rebirth
2001: Return to Normality and Business- Economic Recovery
In the fifteen weeks after September 11, we found that return to normality and business/economy were the dominant categories in newspaper
articles focused on the rebirth of the World Trade Center. Indeed, almost
two- thirds of the articles during this time centered on these two categories. Initially, the desire to return to normality was the most prevalent
category. This category rapidly declined, however, with most such articles
occurring in the first few weeks (Week 1 = 11; Week 2 = 13; Week 3 = 12;
Week 4 = 5; subsequent weeks = 1). Thus, this was a topic of intense but
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ultimately fleeting concern, a change we analyze in greater depth in the
following subsection.
The other major category to emerge after 9/11 focused on business
and the economy. In the fifteen weeks following 9/11, one to two articles
per week were published on this topic. These articles largely featured
themes of resilience, as businesses attempted to bounce back and move
forward despite damages, challenges, and the social and economic upheaval caused by 9/11. Indeed, each move forward was often portrayed as
a victory or a symbol of New Yorkers’ defiance against their attackers. As
we describe in the next section, many business- focused articles in 2001
specifically related to entertainment as an indicator of New York City’s
recovery, resilience, resourcefulness, and vitality.
2002–2004: Professionals/Architectural Planning
Professional/architectural planning was the dominant category for the rebuilding process for three years, from 2002 to 2004. In 2002, these articles
centered on competing visions for constructing the Ground Zero site;
downtown’s redevelopment and restoration; and the selection of consultants and design teams for the project as a whole and for specific elements
of the redevelopment process. In 2003, conflict first began to emerge over
how to how to reshape downtown and who should do it. Many articles
here discussed professionals and architectural planning for rebuilding the
Ground Zero site and appraisals of the proposed designs. In particular, the
articles featured architects David Childs and Daniel Libeskind and their
competing visions of redevelopment of the World Trade Center site. In
2004, conflicts among architects, politicians, and the leaseholder, Larry
Silverstein, were especially prominent in the news.
2005–2006: Political Issues
For the fourth and fifth years after the 9/11 attacks, political issues came
to the fore. These articles included: politicians vying to lead the rebuilding
effort; the complex approval process for the Trade Center rail hub; controversies concerning the Freedom Museum; Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s
vision for rebuilding; the reconsidering of prior building plans; the collision between design and expense; the unclear role of oversight agencies;
and the selection of a joint venture in order to build the PATH rail station.
In 2006, news articles on the rebirth of the World Trade Center focused on the allocation of post–9/11 funds; the clash over redevelopment
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of the Ground Zero site between US Senator Charles Schumer and Mayor
Bloomberg; New York Governor George Pataki’s attempts to revive talks
on construction and his dealings with World Trade Center Leaseholder
Larry Silverstein; summits convened to discuss Ground Zero plans; the
resignation of the memorial chief at Ground Zero; disputes over World
Trade Center tenant deals; and plans by the United States and New York
State governmental agencies to occupy Freedom Tower.

Analysis: Shifting Concerns, Conflicts, and Challenges,
2001–2006
The preceding discussion identified the shifting terrain and a variety of
challenges and conflicts in the five years following 9/11. A deeper analysis
also found that five key themes emerged over this time in (loosely) sequential order, which we explore in this section. The shifting dominance
of these challenges and concerns reveals complex tensions set in motion
after the World Trade Center’s destruction.
Theme One: Normality and Change
As described in the previous section, in 9/11’s immediate aftermath, the
news first concerned peoples’ desire for things to get back to normal. The
shock of 9/11 prompted existential and practical questions: What does it
mean for things to be normal? Will normality return by resuming one’s
routine daily activities and social relations? Or is something else necessary,
such as rebuilding what has been lost? And does returning to normality
ultimately disrespect those who were killed?
In the weeks after 9/11, news articles traced different ways of resuming
normality from small everyday activities like sketching or eating salad in
the park23 to taking part in larger social events such as movies and football
games.24 In these articles, people prized what had been familiar and taken
for granted, and they found a sense of mastery, even triumph, in doing
what previously had been routine.
Too much normality, however, was also seen as problematic.25 For example, New Yorkers questioned such basic things as whether it was okay
to laugh, or whether this was inappropriate given recent events. Individuals consequently wondered what matters were frivolous and thereby
possibly a misguided preoccupation, or whether embracing some frivolity
was helpful to dispel a sense of despair, fear, or helplessness.26 These articles
reported that New Yorkers were continually plagued by such questions
but very few of the articles (or personal narratives) provided any answers.
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Theme Two: Entertainment and Solidarity
A second theme that emerged in the New York Times articles in 2002 was
the connection between solidarity and popular entertainment. Immediately
after the attack, the city lacked reliable communication and transportation
networks, increasing individuals’ sense of isolation and anxiety. As theaters,
sports events, nightclubs, and museums reopened one by one, the news
cheered the return of the liveliness they contributed to a beleaguered city.
Although these destinations offered distraction, perhaps more important, they allowed people to be closer to one another. Indeed, these
communal events engendered a sense of camaraderie even when those
gathered had little in common besides having lived through the experience of 9/11.27 Initially, media executives assumed that the collective
psyche would be easily offended, frightened, or traumatized by violent
entertainment.28 But regardless of such content, cultural events seemed
to distract, soothe, and alleviate persons’ boredom, dread, and repetitive
thoughts.29
Initially, news articles principally focused on the public’s return to such
venues. Over time, however, the articles began focusing on cultural practitioners themselves. Various jazz musicians, for example, were featured
as describing their reluctance to leave their family or even play music.30
Other entertainers expressed caution about evoking audience sensitivities,
memories, and fears connected with September 11.31 Performers also attempted to “carry on in ways large and small,” organizing blood drives or
volunteering to take part in ongoing rescue operations at Ground Zero.32
Interestingly, as detailed in the previous section, this emphasis on entertainment faded from the news early in 2002, only a few months after
9/11. At this point, news articles concerned the architecture and design
competitions surrounding Ground Zero,33 and by 2003, these competitions became a public spectacle in themselves, pitting particular designers
and their advocates, often prominent politicians, against one another.34
Theme Three: Socioemotional Versus Economic Concerns
A third sequential theme was the struggle between socioemotional and
economic values, which became evident as people looked ahead to the
rebuilding of the World Trade Center site in 2002. Social psychologist
Morton Deutsch has observed that socioemotional and economic values
inevitably conflict. The former focuses on the “solidarity relations among
group members,” and the latter on “external tasks” and “problem solving.”35
In other words, as journalist Alan Murray has suggested, commemorating

22

Zachary Baron Shemtob, Patrick Sweeney, and Susan Opotow

loss and accruing capital may constitute discrete and potentially opposed
societal priorities.36
This tension between these value systems emerged in 2002 in lower
Manhattan when designs for the new World Trade Center site raised fears
that a purely commercial building would disrespect those who had died.37
Indeed, the six earliest designs of the new World Trade Center embodied
this fear: These designs were vehemently opposed by the public not for
aesthetic or functional reasons, but due to the large proportion of space
allocated for offices.38 As a victim’s relative remarked, “we got what was
there before,”39 apparently disappointed by the replication of the original
World Trade Center’s commercial purpose along with its utilitarianism
and (assumed) lack of heart.
Perhaps remarkably, these criticisms resulted in a quick shift by city and
state officials. The Lower Manhattan Development Corporation, for example, which had endorsed the original six designs, agreed to reduce and
revise these proposals.40 The six designs in the initial competition were
then scrapped in favor of a new public competition and revisions to the
process that would make it less opaque.41 The next set of designs garnered
more public approval, but the public’s response to them was mixed. Nikki
Stern, whose husband had been killed on 9/11, lamented that this round
of designs “involved a lot more design and creativity,” but did not yet reconcile how to balance commemorating the lives of those who died with
the goal of commercial development.42
We thus see the emergence of two issues here. First is the supposed
heartlessness and depersonalization of economic decision making, which
is driven by the bottom line rather than a concern for suffering and loss.
The interests of developers and businessmen were in stark contrast with
what the families of those killed on 9/11 and what the larger public saw
as an appropriate memorial.43 The second issue is an ironic refutation of
what the original World Trade Center actually stood for: to foster trade
on a global scale and incorporate a significant amount of office space in
order to do so. In other words, the World Trade Center epitomized “hard
economics.”44 In contrast, the same site post–9/11 was being held to a
higher standard. Unlike the original World Trade Center, the new site was
expected to transcend business interests and the cold agglomeration of
capital to attend instead to social relations and the commemoration of loss.
Theme Four: The Fading Public Voice
A fourth theme that emerged in the World Trade Center’s rebirth was the
role of the public voice and its eventual disappearance. The salience of the
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public voice can be traced throughout all five years after 9/11. Nevertheless, as explained in the previous section, public influence reached its apex
in 2002 and 2003—in the early part of the design process—before being
displaced in the news by attention to various political leaders.
Immediately after 9/11, the NewYork Times featured a multiplicity of different voices, from affected downtown street vendors to victims’ spouses.45
At first, no voice was treated by the New York Times as paramount, and
thus no person or group was seen as speaking for the public as a whole.
Rather, the public was viewed as united in its shock, grief, and desire to
resume normality.
As decisions about the rebuilding process gained ascendency, however, this sense of solidarity and egalitarianism faded and victims’ families
held the greatest sway. Wives of those who perished on 9/11 were most
prominently featured in the news, with their grief seen as providing a
moral clarity that transcended petty politics or individual self- interest.46
But, by the middle of 2003 even the voices of victims’ families were effectively sidelined. Certain persons from the public (e.g., survivors or victim’s family members) were selected for some planning committees or
commissions and their voices were occasionally mentioned in the news.47
Nonetheless, the New York Times principally focused on prominent individuals tasked with the site’s rebuilding, whether Governor George Pataki
or architects Daniel Libeskind and David Childs.48 As the process became
enmeshed in negotiations and political maneuvering and the focus moved
to questions of logistics and technical expertise, the public voice became
less and less prominent.
Theme Five: Priorities and Power
The final major theme we found to emerge in the 9/11 rebuilding process was, unsurprisingly, power. The city remained relatively peaceful
following 9/11, with little looting or violence. At first, shocked political
leaders appeared to offer the public little more than avuncular advice such
as to “go to the theater.”49
As we described above, however, in 2003 and beyond political dynamics took center stage in Lower Manhattan. Conflicts erupted over dueling
design conceptions for the new World Trade Center site, as politicians
aligned themselves with particular architects and became champions of
specific visions for Ground Zero.50 This was further complicated by the
interests of the World Trade Center’s leaseholder, Larry Silverstein; the
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, the site’s owner; the Lower
Manhattan Development Corporation, which had administrative control
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over the World Trade Center site; New York State Governor George Pataki;
and New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg.51
Eventually, the initial hopes for a simple consensus gave way to more
coercive methods to resolve intransigent conflicts, such as when Governor Pataki declared a midnight deadline for the disputing parties to
reach agreement.52 Such tactics effectively eliminated public input and
attempted to force more powerful individuals to compromise on their
preferred rebuilding goals. Although eliminating transparency and public
engagement may have expedited the rebuilding process, it also may have
prevented other issues from being raised by a broader set of stakeholders
with a range of interests in the World Trade Center site.53

The Park51 Controversy
Although the preceding five themes emerged in the half- decade following 9/11, it was unclear, without further inquiry, whether they remained
germane as the post- disaster period later unfolded. To determine whether
such issues persisted beyond 2006, we therefore focused on another event
directly linked with 9/11 that generated a significant amount of news
coverage: a highly- publicized controversy in 2010 surrounding the development of Park51 in Lower Manhattan, the so- called Ground Zero
Mosque. In the following section we describe this controversy, discuss the
five themes analyzed in the previous section and their relevance to this
event, and, to further broaden our understanding of post–9/11 conflict
and change, compare how these themes manifested themselves in the first
five years after 9/11 versus in the debate over Park51.
A Brief History of Park51
Although the Park51 Islamic Community Center was known to many as
the “Ground Zero Mosque,” it is neither at Ground Zero nor is it technically a mosque. Consequently, we use its official name, Park51. The site consists of two adjacent buildings located at 45–47 Park Place and 49–51 Park
Place between Church Street and West Broadway in Lower Manhattan,
two blocks (600 feet or 180 meters) north of the World Trade Center site.54
Modeled on the 92nd Street Y, a nonprofit cultural and community
center in Manhattan, Park51 was originally named “Cordoba House” and
planned as an interfaith community center open to all New Yorkers, regardless of religion. Park51’s planners wanted its thirteen stories to “rise
two blocks from the pit of dust and cranes where the twin towers once
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stood, a symbol of the resilience of the American melting pot.”55 They
initially envisioned a building with two floors for Muslim prayer space.
Other floors would house a five- hundred- seat auditorium, a theater, a
performing arts center, a fitness center, a swimming pool, a basketball
court, a childcare center, an art gallery, a bookstore, a culinary school, and
a restaurant.56
The center’s construction was first reported as controversial in the
New York Times in May 2010, when a normally uneventful community
board meeting turned into a raucous hearing debating whether a supposed mosque should be built at Ground Zero.57 This conflict over the
two buildings’ proposed usage soon erupted into a media firestorm driven
by anti- Muslim groups and politicians who seized on this controversy. Although many New Yorkers were appalled by what they saw as the Islamophobic views concerning Park51, some also expressed reservations about
building an Islamic cultural center so close to Ground Zero.58
After media attention to the controversy diminished and the development plans cleared the normal regulatory hurdles, construction on Park51
began. Nevertheless, new obstacles to the project soon emerged. In 2011, a
rift developed between Park51’s developer, Sharif El- Gamal, and the imam
associated with the project, Feisal Abdul Rauf. El-Gamal and Rauf clashed
over the future of the project, leading Rauf to eventually step down, only
to have his replacement resign three weeks later for making homophobic
remarks.59 Meanwhile, on September 21, 2011, a surprisingly quiet and
controversy- free photo exhibit marked the official launch of Park51 in a
makeshift gallery space on the ground floor of 45–47 Park Place.60
Nevertheless, Park51’s troubles persisted. Later that year, the landlord of
one of the buildings, Consolidated Edison, demanded $1.7 million in back
rent from the developer, initiating a dispute that further endangered the
proposed plans.61 After the rent dispute was resolved, ongoing fundraising
shortfalls plagued the project.62 As this is being written ( January 2018),
plans for the site now consist of luxury apartments ranging in price from
approximately $2 to 41 million.63 Ultimately, this forty- three- story apartment complex is expected to open in 2019 alongside a much scaled- down
three- story Islamic museum and public plaza.64
Thematic Analysis of the Park51 Controversy

Normality and Change

As described in the prior section, in the first five years after 9/11, the
theme of normality and change was reflected in the tension between
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persons’ desires to return to normal while appropriately honoring the
memory of those lost. By 2009, New Yorkers had eight years to resume
their lives. Perhaps for this reason, the early plans to develop Park51 were
not controversial. Indeed, they drew “encouragement from city officials
and the surrounding neighborhood,” with a spokesman for the mayor
quoted as saying “If it’s legal, the building owners have a right to do what
they want.”65
This sense of civic calm was not to last, however. Five months later,
stoked by Internet commentators and right- wing websites, Lower Manhattan’s Community Board No. 1 was inundated with calls and emails
concerning the proposal, the majority of these from outside New York
City.66 Consequently, the community board hearing that followed erupted
into a four- hour heated debate over the appropriateness of the plans,
between those who claimed the community center would represent a
beacon of tolerance and those who claimed that it would offend the
memories of the persons killed on 9/11.67
As local questions of neighborhood planning were transformed into
national and international debates on the nature of Islam and the legacy
of 9/11, New Yorkers were therefore thrust back into the meaning of
the attacks and away from ordinary questions of city administration and
bureaucracy. Although certain New Yorkers believed the “Ground Zero
Mosque” was an affront to those killed by Islamic terrorists, other New
Yorkers were nonplussed by the plans and saw the opposition as amounting to “hysteria.”68 They emphasized that the neighborhood had long included a storefront mosque and also had such disreputable institutions as
“a strip joint, a porno store and a government- run bookie operation.”69
Because of the Park51 controversy, New Yorkers once again scrutinized
normal patterns of urban life and varied kinds of social activities for their
ethical significance. Thus, people were forced to grapple with what was
right to do in the “sacred ground” surrounding Ground Zero, and what
routines of life would permanently alter as a result of 9/11.

Entertainment and Solidarity

During the first five years, the theme of solidarity and entertainment was
illustrated by articles discussing the public’s return to cultural and social
events before shifting to a focus on the public spectacle of design competitions themselves. The controversy over Park51 provided a similar
spectacle. What could have been a local decision regarding the approval
and development of a cultural institution by a community board was
transformed into an uproar and media sensation virtually overnight. As
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opponents of Park51’s supporters became louder, various right- wing
politicians and anti- Muslim groups increasingly made media headlines,
from Pamela Geller, the founder of an Islamophobic website and the Stop
Islamization of America/the American Freedom Defense Initiative,70 to
the pastor of a small Florida church who threatened to burn copies of the
Koran.71 For many people living in New York City, the controversy was
galling. An analysis of the news articles on Park51 in that period found
that many New Yorkers, particularly those who lived close to the site,
were not likely to oppose its construction and viewed the opposition as
antithetical to the inclusionary ethos embedded in what they viewed as
New York values and American ideals.72
Interestingly, each side relied on a sense of collective solidarity to
legitimate its cause. Many of those who supported Park51, like Mayor
Bloomberg, appealed to an abstract notion of “American values,” arguing
that moving the site would insult American Muslims and damage the nation’s standing.73 Those opposed appealed to a vision of America under
siege. Pamela Geller positioned Park51 as a sign of Islamic ideological encroachment on American soil,74 illustrated in advertisements she submitted to the New York City Metropolitan Transit Authority for display on
city buses that linked Park51 to the 9/11 attacks by calling it the “WTC
Mega Mosque.”75 Meanwhile, politicians like Ilario Pantano, a Republican candidate for the US House of Representatives in North Carolina,
campaigned on the Park51 conflict, claiming that it “stirred voters in his
rural district hundreds of miles away from Ground Zero.”76 Although
both sides appealed to America’s collective identity, they therefore did so
by advocating for entirely different outcomes and articulating differing
conceptions of American priorities, ideals, and identity.

Socioemotional vs. Economic Concerns

In the first five years, the theme of socioemotional versus economic concerns reflected the tension and conflict that emerged between an emphasis
on the economic bottom line versus memorialization of 9/11. This theme
was also manifest in the Park51 controversy with the eventual eclipse of
economic concerns as advocates and critics of Park51 appealed to socioemotional concerns. Opponents argued that the center should not be
built because the World Trade Center included not only the “the immediate buildings, but large swaths around them that . . . aren’t measured
in meters or yards, but in emotional sparks.”77 Proponents, like Mayor
Michael Bloomberg’s “voice began to crack” as he spoke for the importance of religious freedom as a core American value.78
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Besides the public controversy, the tension between socioemotional and
economic concerns also played out in the rift between the project’s developer, El- Gamal, and its religious leader, Imam Rauf. The two ultimately
disagreed over the project’s size, its commercial nature, and whether it
should primarily appeal to Muslims or all religious groups.79 Whereas ElGamal particularly stressed Park51’s economic potential, Rauf principally
sought to create a viable community center.80 Their disagreement eventually led to Rauf ’s stepping down, and El- Gamal coming to prioritize
Park51’s real estate potential. In 2017, the revised plans for Park51’s cultural and religious spaces shifted from a thirteen- story community center
with prayer space and public event spaces to a forty- three- story apartment
tower with multimillion- dollar luxury apartments and a scaled- down
three- story Islamic museum and public plaza next door.81

The Fading Public Voice

The Park51 controversy, from its inception, involved a mixture of positions and voices. The New York Times commissioned a poll of New Yorkers’ views on the subject and found that two- thirds of participants wanted
the site relocated to a less “controversial” area.82 Family members of those
lost on 9/11 were also portrayed as “weigh[ing] in” against the project.83
Park51 was described, for example, by Sally Regenhard, the mother of a
firefighter who died on 9/11, as “sacrilege on sacred ground.”84 At one
point, an ex- firefighter gained prominence after (unsuccessfully) suing
to give landmark protection to the site in order to prevent Park51 from
being built there.85
Ultimately, however, politicians and other prominent public figures
from both sides of the issue dominated the conversation over Park51,
like that over the rebirth of the World Trade Center. These included
Mayor Bloomberg (for), New York State Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver
(against), New York State gubernatorial candidates Rick Lazio and Carl
Paladino (both against), US President Barack Obama (for), former US
Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich (against), US vice presidential nominee Sarah Palin (against), the Koran- burning pastor Terry Jones (against),
the Dutch politician Geert Wilders (against), and the aforementioned
congressional candidate Ilario Pantano and prominent anti- Muslim blogger Pamela Geller (both against).86 As these prominent voices came to
dominate the news coverage, they acted as stand- ins for the public at
large. Thus, whereas Gingrich would claim that “the average American
just thinks this is a political statement” and “an aggressive act that is offensive,”87 Bloomberg remarked that “we would be untrue to the best part of
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ourselves—and who we are as New Yorkers and Americans—if we said
no to a mosque in Lower Manhattan.”88

Priorities and Power

Inevitably, as it did for the World Trade Center site, matters of power
surrounded the controversy over 9/11. Ironically, however, none of the
three most prominent voices surrounding the project—despite all their
maneuverings—achieved their purported goals. The Islamic Community
Center’s Imam, Feisal Abdul Rauf, left the project after disputes with
El- Gamal, the project’s developer, and thereafter had to maintain his support for the project from the sidelines. Pamela Geller, perhaps the most
vocal opponent of the “Ground Zero Mosque,” succeeded in preventing
a community center from being built, but now decries the fact that the
site will contain an Islamic museum.89 Finally, El- Gamal, the project’s
developer, eventually settled for building a vast apartment complex and
a much scaled- down Islamic museum, recognizing that he will need to
create his initial vision in a different location.90 This all stands in contrast
to the World Trade Center site, where, while ideas for what should be
constructed differed dramatically, everyone agreed that something should
be built. Park51 lacked any such fundamental consensus. Furthermore,
the conflict surrounding Park51 illuminated one legacy of 9/11 with the
growth of anti- Muslim ideologues seizing upon a local zoning question
to kindle controversy far beyond the boundaries of Lower Manhattan.91

Comparing the First Five Years after 9/11 and Park51
In the first year following 9/11, the New York Times focused on everyday
New Yorkers’ desire for things to return to normal. In particular, New Yorkers initially questioned whether their desire to move on and reconstruct
their lives disrespected those who had died. During this period, entertainment venues, including movies, theaters, or sports arenas, were especially
popular ways for New Yorkers to connect with one another. Over time,
however, the abstract idea of returning to normal was eclipsed by more
pragmatic concerns, such as the mechanics of actually rebuilding the World
Trade Center site. At first, some victims’ relatives were portrayed in the
NewYork Times as public representatives and tangibly affected the rebuilding
process, leading to a proliferation of new designs and pledges to honor
the fallen. Nevertheless, our analysis of articles published in the New York
Times suggested that attention to the public voice significantly waned over
time. In the fourth and fifth years following 9/11, prominent designers and
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elected officials engaged in conflict over the fate of World Trade Center
site, and such persons thus came to determine the future of Ground Zero.
The controversy over Park51 echoed these themes, as proponents and
opponents of the Islamic community center fought over whether allowing this site to be built in Lower Manhattan somehow dishonored the
dead, with the “Ground Zero Mosque” used as a spectacle for electioneering politicians and Islamophobic agitators to foment vitriolic opposition and insert themselves into national news coverage. The question of
public voice also arose here, with community members and victims’ relatives initially given space to express their approval or disapproval towards
plans for the site. As in the first five years after 9/11, however, politicians,
pundits, and inflammatory ideologues who appealed to the public interest
but acted semiautonomously eventually eclipsed these voices. Nonetheless, as opposed to the World Trade Center site, where prominent voices
at least agreed that something should be constructed, Park51 eventually
fell victim to the incompatible interests surrounding it.

Conclusion
Ultimately, we believe that this study provides (at least) three lessons for
those interested in the nature and ramifications of large- scale disasters on
those people and places most affected. First, and perhaps most important
for future scholarship, is the recognition that the longer aftermath of
a disaster is a multifaceted event and cannot simply be understood by
viewing a single affected community, as many 9/11 studies have done;
through short- term dynamics at a broad level; or through gathering the
many individual traumas. Rather, as we have sought to do here, one must
also understand the common priorities that emerge in a disaster’s aftermath, and how these priorities are debated, contested, and shape everyday
experiences and lived interactions. In other words, studies of disaster must
focus on people at individual, group, and collective levels.
Second, we hope to have shown that newspaper articles, despite their
limitations, offer a rich and unparalleled resource for those studying such
everyday experiences and lived interactions. As the first draft of history,
newspapers describe particulars of events and lives, offering detailed accounts of individual and civic challenges and responses that can be analyzed over time. Thus, the New York Times coverage of the five years after
9/11 and for the Park51 controversy allowed us to trace the post–9/11
trajectory as key issues emerged and underwent change, offering insight
into how disasters can play out temporally.
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At the same time, this methodological approach, guided by thematic
coding that identified prominent topics in the news, may have missed topics that were also important and of concern to groups that are typically
underrepresented in media discourse. For example, here we did not discuss
the striking disparities in death compensation that disproportionally benefitted families with high rather than low- wage earners92 and disbursements
to some kinds of businesses over others,93 issues that would have been situated in our “compensation” category. Our study’s categorization therefore streamlined but also narrowed our focus, which we ultimately see as
a both limitation and a contribution of our work: Rather than start with a
priori categories that would have limited our exploration of the news, we
used the news articles themselves to develop these categories.94 Guided by
frequency statistics, these categories then permitted us to trace the larger
post–9/11 trajectory, and reveal details about how people, as individuals
and groups, experienced New York City after this cataclysmic event.
Finally, this chapter both confirms and complicates Stanley Cohen’s
thesis that following a disaster, a community either “recovers its former
equilibrium or achieves a stable adaptation to the changes which the disaster may have brought about.”95 As we have shown, immediately following
9/11, New Yorkers desperately sought to resume normality and regain a
former equilibrium. At the same time, they feared doing so would disrespect the memory of those lost on 9/11. This tension emerged in the
disparity between socioemotional and economic values as rebuilding the
World Trade Center commenced, and reemerged once more in the Park51
controversy between those who felt that building an Islamic Community
Center was disrespectful to the memory of the tragedy and those that felt
such a project was an affirmation of core American values. Ironically, this
resulted in the return of a sort of normality as somewhat familiar economic
and political conflicts returned to dominate the public discourse.
As this study and the rest of the chapters in this book show, however, this
new equilibrium provided a host of novel complications and uncertainties
all of its own, concerning debates over American ideals and identity, the
meaning of Islam,96 and how to properly commemorate and respect a site
of great horror. For example, Park51, as a “planned sign of tolerance,”97 will
not be constructed as a monument to New York City’s cosmopolitanism
and inclusionary ethos. As this vividly illustrates, although various factions
attempted to influence the rebuilding of Lower Manhattan, at the forefront of this process was a combination of vested economic interests and
debates over the role of those striving communities and individual stories
that make up the tapestry of this vibrant city of immigrants.
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